Redemption elimination
docs(corporate wiki): fidelity sweep — 15 of 65 articles defective across all 12 categories; MCorp/WCP entity-attribution regression, unresolved CTO-vs-active-offering contradiction (escalated), wrong insider-report deadline, unhedged AGM claims, legal-term errors
@@ -49,6 +49,15 @@ The Direct-Hold architecture is immune to this failure mode. There is no queue t The structural consequence for investors is explicit: MCorp does not provide a redemption facility. Liquidity depends on the private market for the specific asset. The Direct-Hold structure carries a different risk profile than a pooled fund — the corporate entity makes no liquidity commitment it cannot fulfill, because no pooled capital exists from which such a commitment could be honored. **Correction (2026-08-02, verified against [[corporate-structure]]):** this sentence attributes a governance-adjacent decision to MCorp — a leftover instance of the entity-governance error corrected corpus-wide 2026-07-30, missed because this file (in `distributions/`) was outside that pass's target list. Per the corrected model, MCorp "does not originate or govern the limited partnerships"; the entity that would (or wouldn't) provide a redemption facility is each vehicle's own governing body — in Canada, the General Partner, Woodfine Professional Centres Inc. — not MCorp. **Flagged, not resolved.** Without a redemption queue, no coordinated exit pressure can destabilize the portfolio. Long-term equity compounds without the structural drag of a cash reserve that earns less than the underlying assets, consistent with the [[topic-perpetual-equity-model|perpetual equity model]] applied to fractional investor holdings. ## The bottom line