Principal alignment and fee preservation
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Rescope remaining LP-specific claims (accredited-investor-eligibility.md's NI 45-106 scope, direct-hold-framework.md's general-partner mention, perpetual-equity-model.md's Take Over Bid mechanism, principal-alignment-fee-preservation.md's offering-cost-reimbursement/no-NAV-fee clauses) to Canada/US explicitly; convert 6 dangling plain-text 'Interest Coverage Ratio' references to proper wikilinks pointing at cre-financial-metrics.md across ifrs-forecast-methodology and sensitivity-and-stress-test-methodology (EN+ES)
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ The developer's equity position, once earned through the holding period and inve ## Initial Offering Cost Reimbursement Separate from the ongoing overhead contribution, WCP pays all costs and expenses of each offering of units. In exchange, the partnership reimburses WCP 1% of the gross proceeds from the sale of units in that offering, as partial payment of those offering costs. This is a one-time reimbursement tied to a specific offering, not a recurring management fee. Separate from the ongoing overhead contribution, WCP pays all costs and expenses of each offering of units. In the established Canada vehicle, the partnership reimburses WCP 1% of the gross proceeds from the sale of units in that offering, as partial payment of those offering costs, per its governing agreement. This is a one-time reimbursement tied to a specific offering, not a recurring management fee. ## The Fixed Annual Overhead Contribution @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ Variable management fees — acquisition fees, asset management fees, dispositio ### Fee predictability and valuation independence This structure eliminates several characteristics of the conventional management fee that create misalignment between manager incentives and investor interests. First, the fee does not grow as the vehicle's assets appreciate — a vehicle whose net asset value doubles does not produce double the management fee. Second, the fee is predictable at the time of investment: the investor can calculate the total management overhead cost for the full holding period at inception. Third, the fee is not subject to manipulation through asset valuation — since the fee is calculated on the Gross Funded Value rather than a marked net asset value, there is no incentive to inflate reported valuations to increase fee income. The partnership agreement prohibits paying any person a fee calculated by reference to net asset value. This structure eliminates several characteristics of the conventional management fee that create misalignment between manager incentives and investor interests. First, the fee does not grow as the vehicle's assets appreciate — a vehicle whose net asset value doubles does not produce double the management fee. Second, the fee is predictable at the time of investment: the investor can calculate the total management overhead cost for the full holding period at inception. Third, the fee is not subject to manipulation through asset valuation — since the fee is calculated on the Gross Funded Value rather than a marked net asset value, there is no incentive to inflate reported valuations to increase fee income. In the established Canada vehicle, its governing agreement prohibits paying any person a fee calculated by reference to net asset value. ## Fee Preservation for Independent Asset Managers